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ciation for Thoracic Surgerydoi:10.1016/j.jtcvs.2004.03.023Marc de Leval1 presented a cumulative sum (CUSUM) chart toThe American Association for Thoracic Surgery in Chicago10 years ago. His graph (Figure 1) showed an outstandingseries of 52 cases performed with just 1 death early in theadoption of the arterial switch operation for transposition ofthe great arteries. The CUSUM graph concluded with a sim-
ilarly excellent, nearly flat line with 1 death in the most recent 39 cases. Sandwiched
between them was a cluster of deaths. de Leval’s CUSUM chart was simple,
explicit, and intuitive; each operation moved the graph 1 unit along the horizontal
axis, and each death moved it up by 1 unit on the vertical axis. It enabled those of
us fortunate to be present at what proved to be a landmark presentation to follow the
story with absolute clarity. de Leval charted the results for a single procedure.
Prompted by his presentation, and convinced that this method would help us display
and understand our outcomes better, we worked toward a method of displaying data
sequentially that would also allow for variable risk in series of different case mix.
We dubbed the method variable life-adjusted display (VLAD),2 but other terms
have also been used.3
Rogers and colleagues4 discuss use of this and other charts in a timely and helpful
tutorial. VLAD charts are now widely used. The Society of Cardiothoracic Surgeons
of Great Britain and Ireland (SCTS) displays outcome in this format,5 and the charts
are commonly used to inspect trends in mortality for surgical units, individual
surgeons, and trainees. As Rogers and colleagues4 point out, control charts have the
merit of being intuitive. Principles of the display are readily grasped. Upward and
downward trends and their duration and steepness can be read instantly and clearly.
However, these charts are methods of displaying data; they are not tests of statistical
significance. Even so, statistical methods have been developed that assist their
interpretation. We have suggested a method for use in cardiac surgery (Figure 2) to
assess variation in outcomes across a series of cases,6 and Grunkemeier and
colleagues3 have used 95% two-sided prediction limits. Spiegelhalter included alert
and alarm lines in de Leval’s original display.1
There is a notion that poor performance is always known on the inside. If so, by
whom? The anesthesiologist or perfusionist? Let us illustrate the fallacy of that
belief and the power of sequential displays. Figure 3 (plotted after the event)
displays results of several surgeons performing coronary artery bypass grafting.
Risk adjustment was by the original Parsonnet score.7 The surgeon whose results are
graphed in bold was in line with the other surgeons for the first 100 operations,
matched those expected on the basis of the Parsonnet score for the next 100, and was
obviously worse than expected for the third 100. He was perceived as being at the
peak of his intellectual and technical powers and known as a surgeon willing to take
on the most exacting cases. The excess deaths went unnoticed by him and his
colleagues. Then, he was suddenly discovered to have an unsuspected cortical visual
defect.
It should be noted that there are runs of good and not so good results within the
other surgeons’ series and in any VLAD plot.2-4 These performance variations are
in themselves interesting and appear greater than those seen when we simulate with
randomly allocated deaths within a sequence. That is to say, they are more than
common-cause variation. However, the particular downward trend shown in Figure
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TISTICS3 would surely, if seen in real time, have prompted a
question. What statistical test might have been used is a
different issue; not all instances of deteriorating perfor-
mance need statistical proof or merit statistical analysis.
When an institution suspects deteriorating performance, it
needs to be demonstrated explicitly for fair and open anal-
ysis and discussion.
Our second example deals with results of a single sur-
geon during 1990 to 1994, well before the issues surround-
ing performance monitoring heated up (Figure 4). The sur-
geon was believed by colleagues to be underperforming, but
believed himself to have acceptable results given the case
mix undertaken, and indeed he was not a man to shy away
from risk. He defended himself vigorously against what he
regarded as an attempt at unfair dismissal and took his
Figure 1. Cumulative failures (CUSUM) according to op
neonatal arterial switch repairs of transposition of the
are 80% alert lines, and dashed lines are 95% alarm lin
(From de Leval MR, Francois K, Bull C, Brawn W, Sp
Application to a Series of Neonatal Arterial Switch O
Figure 2. VLAD for series of 393 operations performed by single
surgeon expressed as expected minus observed deaths accord-
ing to operation type, age, left ventricular function, urgency of
operation, and previous cardiac surgery.8 Prediction intervals
represent distribution of outcomes at end of series if all observed
variation is due to chance.employing hospital to court. His colleagues had the sorry
824 The Journal of Thoracic and Cardiovascular Surgery ● Decetask of explaining Figure 4 to lawyers. Earlier explicit
display of performance in an intuitively obvious form might
have saved some lives, as well as the surgeon’s reputation.
We cannot assume that a human being will recognize the
first decline in performance, stop, and seek help. On the
contrary, a surgeon who cannot live with risk, who cannot
get back in the saddle after being thrown, is probably not in
the right job. It is a fact of life, albeit unpalatable, that doctors
need external agencies to regulate their performance.
VLAD charts are gaining in popularity because they are
intuitive and can reveal trends meriting inspection and dis-
cussion. We have given some examples where display of the
results is itself enough to lead to an explanation and a
solution. We are left, however, with the problem of how to
decide what is acceptable, what is questionably acceptable,
and how to determine at what point results have become
unacceptably bad. The debate about whether we can or
ive sequence (patient number) among 104 consecutive
t arteries. Heavy solid line is CUSUM, fine solid lines
luster of deaths is apparent in midportion of sequence.
lhalter D. Analysis of a Cluster of Surgical Failures:
ions. J Thorac Cardiovasc Surg. 1994;107:914-24).
Figure 3. VLAD for group of 6 surgeons. Expected mortality was
calculated according to Parsonnet model. Notice that after run of
deaths (bold line), 1 surgeon stopped operating after discovery of
a cortical visual handicap.erat
grea
es. C
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Sone,3,4,6 but it is also important to remember that displaying
sequential risk-adjusted data does not create a problem,
although it may reveal one. We have always had to decide
how to declare what is “significantly” worse than an accept-
able standard. It is inherent in the problem that an alert (to
use de Leval’s term1) must signal before the conventional
level of scientific proof required to test a scientific hypoth-
esis; if we allow events to run their course until a conven-
tional level of significance is reached (such as P  .05),
many lives will have been lost.
Whenever results of treatment are collected, it would be
sensible to ask, “For what purpose?” Current pressure in the
United Kingdom to collect and make available mortality
data is for the early recognition of episodes of underperfor-
mance, whether from the surgeon’s skill, the institution’s
systems, or any other cause. The SCTS has decided that it
will present non–risk-adjusted mortality data with 99.99%
confidence intervals. This means that only once in 10,000
instances would a run of deaths occurring by chance (that is
to say, common-cause variation4) be unfairly attributed to a
surgeon experiencing a run of “bad luck.” Of course, the
corollary is that true problems may not be detected in time
to avert disaster—and yet one might have thought that was
the original purpose of monitoring. In defense of this deci-
sion, the SCTS expresses the view that those on the inside
will already have discovered that performance is slipping,
which is a way of saying that the open publication of results
is window dressing for public consumption, and meanwhile,
surgeons will look after their own affairs. The SCTS is of
the view that real problems will be picked up long before
their proposed test becomes positive, so the public will
never see a surgeon’s results cross the P  .0001 threshold.
Let us hope so for the patients’ sake (for that represents a lot
of deaths), the surgeon’s sake (for that will be a mighty fall),
and for the reputation of the surgical profession, which in
the United Kingdom has suffered enough suspicion and
criticism in recent years. “Trust me—I’m a doctor” is no
longer sufficient reassurance.
For those who remain uncomfortable without P values,
formal statistical inference derived from sequential mortal-
ity data requires great care.6 Certainly VLAD charts should
not be used as a method for formal hypothesis testing.
Whatever methods are used for such a purpose, they must
take into account repeated testing and the fact that succes-
sive hypothesis tests are carried out on data sets that over-
lap. Case-mix correction considerably complicates hypoth-
esis testing. For example, it may be mathematically
convenient to test the hypothesis that there has been a
uniform inflation of all risks by the same factor—the as-
sumption in the control limit methods described by Rogers
The Journal of Thoraciand colleagues.4 Whether this reflects the realities of what
happens if a surgeon’s performance declines is dubious,
because one might expect a disproportionately high increase
in mortality for technically challenging rather than routine
procedures. Further, we have noted that surgeons with over-
all excellent results have had runs of as many as 50 to 100
operations in which their results fell below those expected
according to a risk model, even for the now too-forgiving
Parsonnet model.
We reiterate all the caveats of Rogers and colleagues,4 in
particular that VLAD was intended as a means of data
display and with appropriate control limits might serve as a
statistical “ready reckoner,” but it should not be used as a
hypothesis testing method.
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